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Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  167 
NOMINAL CONVERGENCE: THE CASE OF ROMANIA 
 





The main objectives of this paper are: determining the extent to which the indicators of nominal 
convergence reflect the reality of the Romanian economy, in order to find an optimal correlation 
between nominal and real convergence from the point of view of a dualist approach, meaning that 
there are opinions according to which nominal convergence (by the formal meeting of the Maastricht 
criteria) must be carried out before real convergence, or on the contrary, that real convergence has 
positive effects on nominal convergence; short term forecasting for the evolution of nominal convergence 
indicators in Romania comparing with other new EU member states. 
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Under the Maastricht rules, a EU member country must achieve a high degree of 
price stability, keep its government finances sustainable and maintain a stable 
exchange rate and convergence in long term interest rates in order for it qualify for 
Eurozone membership.  The challenge the new member states are facing is how to 
proceed with monetary integration in order to enter in a large monetary union. The 
Maastricht criteria form a coherent package based on a set of economic indicators 
that is neither negotiable nor subject of change.  
Prior to the euro adoption, a country must be a member of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism - ERM II for a minimum 2 years, that means fixes its exchange rate to 
euro with a central rate with a fluctuation band of ±15%. The entry in ERM II 
should not be considered before a sufficient degree of nominal convergence and 
structural adjustment has been reached [De Grauwe, Schnabl, (2004)]. First, by 
setting the central rate misalignments need to be avoided. Equilibrium exchange rate 
is extremely difficult to asses when major structural adjustments have not yet been 
achieved and nominal convergence is not in advance stage. Second, if participation in 
ERM II occurs too early, maintaining simultaneously price stability and exchange rate 
stability could become extremely difficult.  
The real and nominal convergence coincides with two particular macroeconomic 
phenomena: 
  many new member states have experienced large capital inflows in the form 
                                                 
 Ramona Orăștean is Associate Professor at the “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, Faculty of 
Economic Sciences  Romania, Sibiu. E-mail: torasib@yahoo.com. 
Silvia Mărginean is Associate Professor at the “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, Faculty of 
Economic Sciences Romania, Sibiu. E-mail: silvia_marginean@yahoo.com. Nominal Convergence: The Case of Romania 
  168 
of foreign direct investment. The prospect of future productivity increased, the low 
capital stock and the abundance of well-educated work force has fostered these 
inflows. FDI fosters capital accumulation and has brought in transfers of technology. 
It increases the linkage of new member states and EU-15 and helps the achievement 
of real convergence and cohesion [Issing, (2004)]; 
  an expected trend appreciation of the real exchange rate due to the 
occurrence of the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, that gives a supply-side 
explanation for the differences in the price levels between countries in different 
stages of economic development [Balassa, (1964)]. The Balassa-Samuelson model 
describes a possible path of convergence in the price level as developing economies 
catch up with those that are more developed. Higher labour productivity in the 
traded goods sector will raise the wage level in the whole economy. Due to the 
model’s assumption that the production elasticity of labour is higher in the non-
traded goods sector than in the traded goods sector, labour productivity increases in 
the former will be smaller. The rising wage level will therefore lead to higher prices 
for non-traded goods and a rising price level. However, as the Balassa-Samuelson 
model only focuses on one aspect of price level convergence, its applicability for new 
members in the catch-up process is limited. 
The greatest difference between the new EU member states and the EU-15 is 
the level of economic development measured in terms of GDP/capita. 
Macroeconomic stabilization, pursued in order to achieve the nominal convergence 
criteria, is also compatible with real convergence i.e. the capacity to achieve, in 
parallel, high enough rates of real GDP growth in order to maintain progress towards 
real convergence. Experience has shown that the two processes can be mutually re-
enforcing, notably if the process of nominal convergence acquires enhanced 
credibility, affecting thus the formation of key variables such as interest rates, wages 
and prices.  
It is often argued that enlarging the euro area by admitting countries still in the 
catch-up process would impair the ECB’s policies, because real convergence in the 
new member states is inevitably connected with higher inflation rates [Sinn, Reutter, 
(2001)]. In such circumstances, the ECB would only be able to achieve its target of a 
maximum inflation rate of 2% for the Eurozone as a whole if the more advanced 
member states had a correspondingly lower inflation rate.  
Nominal convergence  can be forecasted by the completion of the criteria 
established by the Maastricht Treaty regarding: inflation rate, budget deficit, public 
debt, exchange rate and long term interest rate.  
Inflation is one of the most important and painful phenomena that the Central 
and Eastern countries have confronted with repercussions both on the business 
environment but also regarding the flows of foreign direct investments. 
Performances registered by EU regarding inflation management, although very 
different, have had as a common trait a continuous decreasing tendency. Therefore, 
the year before the adhesion, the medium level of inflation in the new member states 
was almost equal with that in EU.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  169 
The same thing can’t be said about Romania which reached at inflation level a 
number of 8 years distance from EU-10 countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia), the level of inflation the year before the adhesion was higher, 6.6%.  
In European Union, after reaching its peak in mid-summer 2008, Harmonized 
Indice of Consumer Prices started to fall back quickly. In the EU-10 region it has 
fallen sharply (from 8.3% in 2008 to 2.6% in 2009), similar to trends in the euro area, 
while in Romania it  decreased less, from 7.9% in 2008 to 5.6% in 2009 (graph 1). 
Graph 1. Annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices of Consumer 
Prices in Romania and EU-10 in 1999-2009 (%)
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In autumn 2009 forecast, National Commission of Forecast in Romania predicts 
for the period 2012-2014 an annual inflation rate (measured by the Consumer Price 
Index) between 2-3% (graph 2). This represents an objective with a special 
importance in carrying out the Maastricht criteria which states maintaining the 
inflation rate under the level of 1.5 over the average of 3 most performing members. Nominal Convergence: The Case of Romania 
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According to National Bank of Romania, in 2009 annual inflation 
(December/December) dropped to 4.74%, with 0.24 percentage points over the 
upper limit of the range around the target of 3.5%. Favourable effects of lower 
inflation were exercised by persistent demand deficit and exchange rate dynamic of 
the Romanian leu. Current projects of the NBR incorporate favourable premises to 
continue disinflation, placing annual inflation at 3.5% in 2010 and 2.7% in 2011. 
In consequence, the disinflation process in Romania must have a powerful slope, 
because starting with 2012 price growth has to be constantly situated around the limit 
of 3%. This is possible only if there is developed a strict fiscal discipline in order to 
eliminate the financial deficiencies, increasing the level of efficiency for activities in 
public companies which will continue to hold monopoly positions as well as 
maintaining a more restrictive monetary policy ensuring the objective’s completion of 
inflation targeting. 
One of the constrain factors of both the economic growth and the development 
of the Central and Eastern European countries was the unbalance of the budgetary 
balances during the period of economic crisis at the beginning of the ‘90s. 
Thereafter, during the recovery period a positive trend has been registered in 
most of the Central and Eastern European countries. However, the comparisons 
between the EU-10 countries reveal a divergent evolution of the budget deficit, 
expressed as a percentage in the GDP, as follows: Estonia and Lithuania have had a 
constant positive evolution for the entire period; starting with 2001, Estonia was the 
only European country that registered a budget surplus; in Latvia and Slovenia, Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  171 
although the budget deficit evolved in a changing trend, its values stayed under 3% 
of GDP; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have confronted a raise in the 
budget deficit during 2000-2006, from 3.7% in 2000 to 6.8% in 2002 and a 
decreasing to 2.6% of GDP in 2006 for the Czech Republic, from 3% in 2000 to 
9.3% of GDP in 2006 for Hungary, after that reducing to 3.8% of GDP in 2008 and 
from 3% in 2000 to 6.3% in 2003 and a decreasing to 1.9% of GDP in 2007 for 
Poland; Slovakia has the largest budget deficit in 2000 (12.3% of GDP) and then 
decreased to 2.8% in 2006.  
The year before the adhesion, only three countries registered a budget deficit 
situated around the value of 1% of GDP, namely: Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. In 
2004 most Central and Eastern European countries registered a reduction of the 
budget deficit as a consequence of applying certain budgetary austerity programs 
together with new methodologies of collecting taxes.  
In Romania, the budget deficit has continuously lowered, in the years before the 
EU adhesion reaching 1.2% in 2004, 1.2% in 2005 and 2.2% of GDP in 2006. 
Taking into consideration the relative high levels registered by most of the Central 
and Eastern European countries the year before the adhesion to the EU, Romania 
was situated on a much better position regarding the budget deficit. 
After 2007 the level of budgetary income and the expenses in Romania raised. 
The level of incomes was higher as a consequence of the improvement of tax 
collecting (direct and indirect) by deepening the financial discipline. Furthermore, as 
a member of the European Union, Romania received financial resources from the 
European Union’s budget through the Structural and Cohesion Funds. At the same 
time the budgetary expenses registered an ascending trend especially because of the 
supplementary efforts demanded by fulfilling the obligations that come with the 
quality of being a member of the EU (financing the Union’s budget) and the 
investments made by the Government as a self financial effort in completing the 
sums received from European funds (co-financing the community funds). 
Budget deficits have widened in 2008 in all EU-10 countries, except Bulgaria 
(with a budget surplus of 1.8% of GDP). Latvia (4.1%), Lithuania (3.2%), Hungary 
(3.8%), Poland (3.6%) and Romania (5.5%) have exceeded the 3% of GDP deficit 
threshold (graph 3).  
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The estimates of the Ministry of Finance foresee a slight reduction of the budget 
deficits during 2010-2011, to 4.1% in 2010 and 2.9% of GDP in 2011.  
A favourable situation is registered in Romania regarding the public debt in 
comparison with some countries from the EU-10 (graph 4). Its dynamics in relative 
figures was positive in the last few years, and so at 2006 level the government gross 
debt represented 12.4% of GDP, much under the 60% level established in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
























In comparison to the year before the adhesion some countries from the EU-10 
group have confronted much higher levels, for example: Hungary (58.4% of GDP), Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  173 
Poland (47.1% of GDP), Slovakia (42.4% of GDP), and the Czech Republic (29.8% 
of GDP). 
The public debt represents an important factor of economic growth as source of 
financing the investments projects for developing the major sectors of the economy. 
It was assumed that after accession the public debt in Romania will register a growth 
in absolute figures as a consequence of financing the supplementary budget deficit 
and the investment projects with a special importance for the following economic 
development. But in 2008, Romania's public debt level stood at 13.6% of GDP, a 
slight increase over the previous year. 
The package of external financing contracted in 2009 from the IMF, European 
Commission, World Bank and other international financial institutions, totalling 
EUR 19.95 billion, the Ministry of Finance is considering the use of foreign loans. 
Incorporating in the indicator of government gross debt (according to ESA95 
methodology) this financial package, the public debt in Romania will represent 30.8% 
of GDP in 2011. 
According to the National Bank of Romania data, in 1999-2009 the evolution of 
the exchange rates of the Romanian Leu to American Dollar and Euro was unstable 
(graph 5). In 1999-2004 both currencies followed an ascendant trend, from 1.53 
ROL to 3.26 ROL in the case of the USD, respectively from 1.63 ROL to 4.05 ROL 
for EUR. In 2005-2007, as a consequence of the appreciation of the national 
currency, the exchange rate of the American Dollar reached 2.91 ROL, 2.80 ROL 
respectively 2.44 ROL and that of the Euro followed the same trend till 3.62 ROL, 
3.52 ROL respectively 3.34 ROL. 
In the period 2008-2009, EU-10 countries with flexible exchange rate systems 
experienced strong depreciation pressures relative to the euro, especially the Polish 
Zloty (from 3.51 in 2008 to 4.33 in 2009), Hungarian Forint (from 251.51 in 2008 to 
280.33 in 2009), Czech Crone (from 24.95 in 2008 to 26.44 in 2009) and Romanian 
Leu (from 3.68 in 2008 to 4.24 in 2009).  
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In autumn 2009 forecast, National Commission of Forecast in Romania 
estimates that the national currency will appreciate slowly, and so that in 2014 the 
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It’s obvious that in the future the national currency will know both a nominal 
and a real appreciation. The real appreciation of the national currency correlated to 
an accentuated growth of the GDP (especially because of the labour productivity) 
would allow Romania to reduce the existent gap to the EU average regarding the 
level of the GDP per capita. On the other side, an excessive appreciation of the 
national currency can negatively affect exports, which would pressure the budget in 
case there are needed adjustments to the balance of payments. 
Maastricht convergence criterion long term interest rates is defined as central 
government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with around 10 years' 
residual maturity. In 2002-2008, the values for this indicator ranged between 3% and 
10% for the EU-10 region, with an increase in 2009, especially in the case of Latvia 
(from 6.43% in 2008 to 12.36% in 2009) and Lithuania (from 5.61% in 2008 to 
14.0% in 2009). In Romania the growth was smaller, from 7.7% in 2008 to 9.69% in 
2009, but the level is still difficult to analyse, because only in April 2005 were 
launched the first bonds with 10-year maturity (graph 7). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  175 
























Romania should enter the ERM II only when all nominal convergence criteria 
and the majority of real convergence criteria are met.  
The inflation rate criteria remain the main critical point of the Romanian 
economy, not fulfilling it, assuming the non-sustainability of the economic macro 
stabilization process. Taking into consideration the predictions of the National 
Commission of Forecast the criteria of the budget deficit and that of the public debt 
will be in the limits stated by the Maastricht Treaty. The criteria of exchange rate 
stability depend on fulfilling the criterion regarding the inflation rate. An appreciation 
in real terms of the national currency increases the disinflation process. The limited 
intervention of the National Bank of Romania on the exchange market should keep 
on so that the exchange rate should be as flexible as possible, which will allow to the 
central bank to assure an internal price stability by growing the monetary policy 
efficiency. Regarding the criteria of the long term interest rate, in 2009 the euro area 
average was 3.81%, comparing with the value for Romania of 9.69%.   
The progresses in fulfilling the nominal criteria of convergence influence the real 
economic variables. Initially the nominal convergence can generate a reduction of the 
performances. Thus, imposing to respect the Maastricht criteria (especially in what 
regard the budget deficit and the public debt) can affect the process of convergence 
of those economies where the level of investments is low. But fulfilling all the 
Maastricht criteria is able to assure a higher macroeconomic stability, which will 
create the premises for a superior rate of economic growth.  
The financial crisis strongly affected the EU economy from the autumn of 2008, 
hitting the member states to a different degree. A great deterioration in public 
finances is taking place so that the fiscal costs of the crisis will be enormous for all 
European countries. In this context it will be more difficult for new EU countries to 
comply with the Maastricht criteria for euro adoption. Yet only Cyprus, Malta, Nominal Convergence: The Case of Romania 
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Slovenia and Slovakia have entered in the euro area. Lithuania saw its application 
rejected in 2007 because it missed the inflation criteria.  
In a recession period, keeping the budget deficit below 3% of GDP will be much 
harder. For this reason, most analysts think that the targets for euro adoption are 
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